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"Greed, cruelty, self-interest, domination, will always be with us.
It's an easy option. Justice is so much more difficult, so much more
complex. But we all dream of justice."-Dame Helen Mirren
during her testimony at the Senate subcommittee hearing on the
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016.
INTRODUCTION

Nazi Germany systematically attempted to exterminate Jews and
Jewish culture' and to make itself the world's political and cultural
epicenter by, among other things, amassing for itself the world's greatest
art collection. 2 In true Napoleonic form, Nazis relentlessly acquired art
from conquered territories and destroyed it, hid it for safe-keeping, or
forwarded it to Germany. 3 With particular aggression, Nazis looted and
seized Jewish-owned art4 and led an "Aryanization" campaign which
included forcing Jews to sell their art to Nazis for far less than the art was

1.

In Austria alone, Nazis murdered 65,000 Jews and approximately 130,000 Jews fled

from Austria permanently. ANNE-MARIE O'CONNOR, THE LADY [N GOLD: THE EXTRAORDINARY

TALE OF GUSTAV KLIMT'S MASTERPIECE, PORTRAIT OF ADELE BLOCH-BAUER 213 (2012).
2. LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA 41-49 (1994).

3.

See generally id. (describing Nazi theft of artistic and historical property during World

War II).

4.

Id. at 38.
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worth.' Since World War II, governments and international bodies have
made efforts to return Nazi-expropriated art to its rightful owners. 6
However, the path to recover the art is often met with resistance, not only
from those who currently possess the art, but also from U.S. procedural
laws that often prevent the rightful owner from regaining possession of
the art.
This Note describes the development of art restitution jurisprudence
in the United States regarding Nazi-expropriated art in particular, and
the procedural obstacles that have prevented claimants from recovering
their art. Traditionally, the two primary procedural obstacles were (1)
acquiring jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns that had the Naziexpropriated art in their possession, and (2) statutes of limitations under
state law. This Note discusses the overcoming of the jurisdictional
obstacle and the recent passage of the Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act of 20168 (HEAR Act) which curtails the statutes-oflimitations obstacle. The HEAR Act created a federal statute of
limitations that preempts statutes of limitations under state law. The
objective of the HEAR Act's statute of limitations is to allow restitution
claims regarding Nazi-expropriated art to reach a resolution on the merits
of the claims. However, the HEAR Act is modest in scope and should be
amended to better fulfill its objective.
PART I - BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS & EXISTING
U.S. POLICIES REGARDING ART RESTITUTION

Shortly after World War II, the international community, including
the United States, addressed the need for the protection of art in future
armed conflicts. Their objectives included preventing the expropriation
of art by an occupying nation and encouraging the return of expropriated
art to its rightful owner. The international community wanted to prevent
a mass-expropriation event, like the one carried out by the Nazis during
World War II, from happening again.

5.

Id. at 30-31.
&

6. See id. at 407-44. See generally Jeffrey Davis, Choosing Among Innocents: Should
Donations to Charitiesbe Protectedfrom Avoidance as FraudulentTransfers?, 23 U. FLA. J.L.

PUB. POL'y 407, 411-13 (2012).
7. For the purposes of this Note, "Nazi-expropriated art" refers to art that was
expropriated by the Nazis, either by looting, theft, or forced sale.

8.
1524.

Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat.
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A. The 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of CulturalProperty
in the Event ofArmed Conflict and its Protocols
One of the most significant international agreements dedicated to
developing protocols to ensure the protection of cultural property during
wartime was established in 1954-the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its
Protocols (1954 Hague Protocol).9 The 1954 Hague Protocol's definition
of "cultural property" includes works of art, architecture, monuments,
and museums. 0 The purpose of the 1954 Hague Protocol was to establish
legal standards that require countries to safeguard their own cultural
property during armed conflict or occupation." It also requires any
invading country that is a party to the 1954 Hague Protocol to refrain
from stealing, pillaging, vandalizing, requisitioning, or misappropriating
any cultural property situated in the invaded or occupied territory.' 2 The
1954 Hague Protocol forbids the destruction or expropriation of cultural
property during any armed conflict or period of occupation.1 3 These
requirements to safeguard and respect other nations' cultural property can
only be waived if "military necessity imperatively requires such a
waiver." 1 4 Furthermore, the 1954 Hague Protocol mandates that any
cultural property removed during an armed conflict or occupation be
returned after the armed conflict or occupation has ceased.' 5
The United States signed the 1954 Hague Protocol in 1954.16
However, the United States did not ratify the 1954 Hague Protocol until
2009, and in doing so, the United States made its ratification subject to
four qualifications, or "understandings," and subject to one declaration.' 7
9. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 295 (7th Cir. 1990).
10.

Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed

Conflict and its Protocols art. 1(a), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague
Convention],

http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID-13637&URL_DO-DO_TOPIC&UR

LSECTION=201.html#SIGNATURE.
1. Id. art. 3.
12.
13.
14.

Id. art. 4.
Autocephalous Greek-OrthodoxChurch of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 296.
Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 4, 12.

15.

Id. art. 18.

16.

Hague Convention, supra note 10.

17.

S. EXEC. Doc. No. 110-26, at 8 (2008). The First Understanding stated that the level of

protection given to certain cultural property is consistent with "existing customary international
law." Id. The Second Understanding stated that a military person's conduct regarding cultural
property is to be judged based on the level of information that was available to the military person
at the time the military person took action. Id The Third Understanding stated that the 1954 Hague
Protocol only applies to conventional weapons and does not affect international law regarding
other types of weapons (e.g., nuclear weapons). Id. at 9. The Fourth Understanding states that the

2017]

FROMPIATITUDES TO THE PASSAGE OFTHE HEAR ACT

375

Notably, the declaration stated that the 1954 Hague Protocol did not
confer any right that would be enforceable in U.S. federal and state courts
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "U.S. courts").1 8
In 1999, the Hague Convention completed a Second Protocol which
addressed weaknesses in the 1954 Hague Protocol. 9 The Second
Protocol narrowed the circumstances in which a nation may claim a
waiver on the basis of military necessity to circumstances where "cultural
property has, by its function, been made into a military objective" and
"there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military
advantage to that offered by directing an act of hostility against that
objective." 2 0 The Second Protocol also required an attacking force to
avoid or minimize any incidental damage to cultural property and
provided enhanced protection to certain types of cultural property. 2 1 To
date, the United States has not signed the Second Protocol.2 2
B. The Washington Conference Principleson Nazi-Confiscated

Art of 1998
One of the most prominent international conferences to address
restitution for Nazi-expropriated art was the Washington Conference on
Holocaust-Era Assets that was held in Washington, D.C. in 1998.23 One
of the accomplishments of the Washington Conference was the
Art
Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated
Washington
(Principles).2 4 The Principles urged nations to facilitate the identification
and return of all Nazi-expropriated art and to identify the pre-War owners
of the art, stating that steps should be taken "expeditiously to achieve a
1954 Hague Protocol requires parties to the treaty to protect cultural property within their own
borders, which means that the party "primarily responsible" for protecting the cultural property
must properly identify the cultural property and ensure that it is not used for an unlawful purpose.
Id.
18. Id. at 9. The Declaration also stated that the 1954 Hague Protocol was self-executing,
i.e., that the 1954 Hague Protocol "operates of its own force as domestically enforceable federal
law," so, ratification of the 1954 Hague Protocol did not require any implementing legislation. Id.
19. See Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999 (entered into force Mar. 9, 2004),

http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL ID=15207&URLDO-DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=
201.html.
20. Id. art. 6(a).
21. Id. art. 7.
22. Id.
23. See Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, Washington
Conference on Holocaust Era Assets (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Washington-Conference-Principles-on-Nazi-confiscated-Art-and-theTerezin-Declaration.pdf.
24. Id.
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just and fair solution." 2 5 The Principles encouraged nations to make
efforts to publicize the discovery of Nazi-expropriated art and to establish
a central registry containing information about the discovered art.2 6
Furthermore, the Principles encouraged nations to develop laws and
procedures in their own legal tradition to facilitate the resolution of
ownership issues surrounding Nazi-expropriated art. 2 7 Forty-four
nations, including the United States, agreed to follow the guidelines
outlined in the Principles. 2 8 However, the guidelines are non-binding and
do not provide claimants with much, if any, support in their efforts to seek
art restitution in U.S. courts. 29
C. Holocaust Victims Redress Act of 1998
In 1998, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act (Redress Act) became
law in the United States. 30 Regarding works of art, the Redress Act noted
that, if the art was expropriated during the Nazi's rule and if there was
"reasonable proof' regarding the identity of the art's rightful owner, then
"all governments should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the
return of . . . [the] art, to the rightful owners."3 1 The Redress Act
authorized the President to appropriate funds to charitable organizations
that assist survivors of the Holocaust. 3 2 Furthermore, it authorized the
President to appropriate funds for "archival research and translation
services to assist in the restitution of assets looted or extorted from
victims of the Holocaust . . . ."33 However, like the conventions and
guidelines previously adopted or ratified by the United States, the
Redress Act did not create a private right of action in U.S. courts for
victims of the Holocaust or their heirs and, according to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Redress Act was not intended to "supersede
traditional state-law remedies." 34 Rather, it was the legislature's intent
that the Redress Act provide for easier access of information, not easier
access to courts. 35 In Orkin v. Taylor, the claimant sought to recover
25.

Id

26.
27.

Id.
Id.

28. Jessica Mullery, Fulfilling the Washington Principles: A Proposalfor Arbitration
Panelsto Resolve Holocaust-EraArt Claims, 11 CARDOZA J. CONFLICT RESOL. 643, 651,651 n.55

(2010).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. at 651-52.
Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 740 ("[T]he general purpose of the statutory scheme was to fund research efforts
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Nazi-expropriated art, which had later been purchased by actress
Elizabeth Taylor; however, the Ninth Circuit held that, because the
Redress Act did not create a private right of action, the claimants were
barred from recovering the art by the statute of limitations under their
state's law.3 6 The claimant argued that the Redress Act's "allocation of
funds for provenance research ... without also creating any federal cause
of action . . . 'taunt[ed] Holocaust victims by providing them with
information to help them locate Nazi-confiscated assets, while denying
them a judicial remedy to reclaim their property if they can find it."' 3 7
D. Terezin Declaration
In 2009, the Czech Republic, among others, held the Prague
Holocaust Era Assets Conference (Prague Conference). 3 8 Forty-six
nations, including the United States, attended the conference. 3 9 The
purpose of the conference was to discuss new and improved ways to
conduct provenance research and to determine whether progress had been
made in the area of art restitution since the 1998 Washington Conference
on Holocaust-Era Assets. 4 0 The Prague Conference concluded with the
issuance of the Terezin Declaration on June 30, 2009.41 The Declaration
urged nations to "support intensified systematic provenance research," to
facilitate efficient restitution of Nazi-expropriated art within their
nation's own legal framework, and to ensure that art restitution claims
"are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits of the
claims." 42 The Terezin Declaration took the position that art restitution
claims should be decided on the merits, and not based on "procedural
technicalities," such as statutes of limitations.4 3 However, the Terezin
Declaration is a non-binding agreement which neither created a private
and to declassify records, while simultaneously encouraging foreign governments, as well as
public and private institutions, to do likewise. In other words, the motivating concern
was not access to courts; it was access to information.").

36.

Id. at 736.

37. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New BattlegroundofMuseum Ethics and Holocaust-Era
Claims: Technicalities TrumpingJustice or Responsible Stewardshipfor the Public Trust, 88 OR.

L. REv. 37, 61 (2009).
38. Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference: Terezin Declaration (June 30, 2009)
[hereinafter Terezin Declaration], http://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/
Washington-Conference-Principles-on-Nazi-confiscated-Art-and-the-Terezin-Declaration.pdf.

39.

Id.; Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574, 577 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010).

40.
41.

Terezin Declaration, supranote 38.
Id.

42.

Id

43. Katharine N. Skinner, Note, Restituting Nazi-Looted Art: Domestic, Legislative, and
Binding Intervention to Balancethe Interests of Victims and Museums, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.

673, 682 (2013).
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right to action in U.S. courts nor revised any procedural rules applied by
U.S. courts.44

PART II - PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES IN
RESTITUTION ACTIONS

U.S. ART

The United States and many other nations support art restitution of
Nazi-expropriated art by encouraging enhanced provenance research and
centralized registries, and by agreeing that Nazi-expropriated art should
be returned to its rightful owner. 4 5 However, these displays of support
and encouragement are of limited use to claimants who are pursuing art
restitution claims in U.S. courts. 4 6 The adopted conventions and laws
neither provide the art-restitution claimant with an enforceable right nor
do they enable the claimant to break through the procedural obstacles that
prevent many claimants from ultimately recovering their Naziexpropriated art from its current possessor. 4 7 Historically, a major
procedural obstacle was obtaining jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
who had possession of the Nazi-expropriated art and who were not
willing to return the art to its rightful owner. Until the recent passage of
the HEAR Act, another major procedural obstacle was the heavy bar that
statutes of limitations under state law often impose on actions to recover
property that was stolen many decades ago.
A. The Development ofForeign Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
In the United States, art restitution claims involve the establishment
of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns that currently possess the Naziexpropriated art. Many works of art that were expropriated by the Nazis
have found their way to museums in the U.S. and to state-owned
museums throughout Europe.4 8 The ability of U.S. courts to acquire
44.

Terezin Declaration, supra note 38; see Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574,

577 n.1, 578-79 (5th Cir. 2010).
45.

See supra PartI.

46. See Mullery, supra note 28, at 651-52 ("Despite the United States's past zealous
displays of support for the restitution of Nazi-looted art and the resolution of looted art claims,

the government's efforts since the Washington Conference have remained limited to mere
encouragement and displays of support, with progress only occurring in the realm of research and
registry. Adherence and endeavors to fulfill the Washington Principles have been limited to those
principles calling for the identification and the archiving of Nazi-looted art, as well as for the

facilitation of access to this archived information for claimants. Specifically, progress has been
limited to procedures that only comprise the beginning of the restitution process, namely research

and identification.").
47.
48.

See supra Part I.
Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem andthe Role ofthe Museum: A Proposed
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jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign-owned museum was imperative to
ultimately recovering the Nazi-expropriated art. In 2004, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed whether a foreign sovereign is immune from
suit in U.S. courts by analyzing whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act of 1976 (FSIA) applied retroactively to claims to recover art that was
expropriated during World War 1I.4 9 This Part discusses the development
of foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence and the principles that relate
to the retroactive application of the FSIA.
1. Schooner and Pre-FSIA Foreign Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
American foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence originated in
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.5 0 Schooner Exchange gave "virtually
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns." 5' Following Schooner
Exchange, U.S. courts customarily declined to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns if a political branch asked it to do so. 52 U.S. courts
deferred to the political branches and gave immunity to foreign
sovereigns as a matter of "grace and comity," but not because they were
constitutionally or otherwise required to grant the immunity.5 3 In 1952,
the U.S. State Department adopted the "restrictive theory" of foreign
sovereign immunity which did not affect the court's deference to the
political branches. 5 4 However, the "restrictive theory" policy created
unclear standards that were not "uniformly applied." 5 In response,
Congress enacted the FSIA. 5 6
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976
The FSIA codified the "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign
immunity and transferred to the judicial branch the decision-making
authority to grant or withhold foreign sovereign immunity. 57 The FSIA is
Solution to Disputes Over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 15, 15 (1998); Christa Roodt, State
Courts or ADR in Nazi-EraArt Disputes: A Choice "More Apparent than Real"?, 14 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 421, 422 (2013).

49.
50.
at 688.
51.
52.
53.

See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Altmann, 541 U.S.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 689.
Id. at 688-89.

54. Id. at 689-90 ("According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of
a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) .....

55.
56.
57.

Id. at 690-91.
Id at 691.
Id
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the only way that U.S. courts may acquire jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign.5 8 The FSIA includes a general grant of immunity 59 and
exceptions. 6 0 The FSIA's expropriation exception indicates that a foreign
sovereign will not be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if the
cause of action involves property that was taken in violation of
international law.6 1 The expropriation exception also requires that the
expropriated property be owned or operated by the foreign sovereign (or
its instrumentality) and that it be engaged in commercial activity in the
United States. 6 2 At the outset of an action against a foreign sovereign or
its instrumentality, the court must decide whether one of the FSIA's
exceptions applies. 6 3 Only if one of the FSIA's exceptions applies will a
U.S. court have subject-matter jurisdiction and the authority to render a
decision in the matter involving the foreign sovereign.64
3. Case Law Interpreting the FSIA
In Verlinden B. V v. CentralBank ofNigeria, there was a contractual
dispute between a foreign sovereign and a foreign corporation. 6 5 The
parties executed the contract in 1975, prior to the FSIA's effective date. 6 6
The corporation filed suit against the foreign sovereign and alleged that
the U.S. court had jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA. 6 7 Ultimately, the
Court addressed whether the FSIA's authorization of a foreign plaintiff's
suit against a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court regarding a non-federal
cause of action violated the U.S. Constitution. 6 8 The Court held that the
FSIA was constitutional because a cause of action against a foreign
sovereign "arises under" federal law. The Court explained that the Court
must determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction by applying
federal law to determine if an FSIA exception applies. 6 9 The Court also
58. See id.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) ("[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of
this chapter.").

60.
61.
62.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (2012).
Id. § 1605(a)(3).
Id

63.

Altmann, 541 U.S. at 691.

64. Id (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983)).
65. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 482 (1983).
66. See id.
67. Id at 483.
68. Id at 482. Article III of the U.S. Constitution indicates the allowable jurisdiction of the
federal courts, and Congress is not authorized to expand the scope of federal court jurisdiction.
Id. at 491. "Article Ill of the Constitution, we find two sources authorizing the grant ofjurisdiction
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: the diversity clause and the "arising under" clause." Id.
69. Id. at 493-94, 496-97.
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explained that, even though the FSIA is labeled as a jurisdictional statute,
the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions are only a part of the FSIA's
"comprehensive scheme," and thus, the FSIA is constitutional.7 0
In Dole Food Company v. Patrickson,the Court addressed whether a
foreign entity's "instrumentality" status under the FSIA should be
determined as of the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred or as of the
time the action was filed.7 1 The Court held that the instrumentality status
must be determined at the time the action commenced, regardless of the
instrumentality status when the alleged conduct occurred, because the
language in the FSIA was in present tense.7 2 The Court affirmed the
"longstanding principle that 'the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon
the state of things at the time of the action brought."' 73
Therefore, the constitutionality of the FSIA was tested and the Court
held that it was constitutional.7 4 Furthermore, for the purposes of the
FSIA's expropriation exception, whether a state-owned entity is deemed
an "instrumentality" of the foreign sovereign depends on the relationship
of the foreign sovereign and the entity at the time the cause of action
commenced.7 5
B. Case Law Interpretingthe PresumptionAgainst Retroactivity
The FSIA was enacted in 1976, more than thirty years after the victimsof the Nazis had their lives, loved ones, possessions, and their art taken
from them. Therefore, claimants who sought to recover their Naziexpropriated art from a foreign sovereign or its instrumentality would
need to establish that the FSIA applied retroactively to expropriations that
occurred during World War II. U.S. courts have applied a general
presumption against the retroactive application of a law; however, the
presumption does not always control.
In Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., the Court articulated the default rule
regarding the presumption against retroactivity: unless Congress intended
or expressed otherwise, the presumption against retroactivity governs
federal statutes that have a retroactive effect. 7 6 A statute has a retroactive
effect if it "impair[s] vested rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase[s] a party's liability for past conduct, or impose[s] new duties
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 496-97.
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 471 (2003).
Id. at 478.

73.

Id. "[Tihe [urisdictional] inquiry is determined by the condition of the parties at the

commencement of the suit." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1891)).
74. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496-97.
75.

Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 478.

76.

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
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with respect to transactions already completed." 7 7 In Landgraf the Court
addressed whether the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act (1991
Amendment) applied retroactively to pre-amendment conduct. 8 Despite
Congress's deliberate deletion of language regarding the amendment's
retroactivity in prior versions of the amendment, the Court concluded that
Congress had not manifested an intent that the 1991 Amendment apply
to pre-amendment conduct. 7 9 Next, the Court concluded that the 1991
Amendment had a retroactive effect because it authorized "punitive" or
"exemplary" damages,8 0 and compensatory damages, which impacted
"private parties' planning." 8 ' The 1991 Amendment created a new cause
of action, a new right to monetary relief, and a "new disability" on liable
employers. 8 2 Therefore, the 1991 Amendment was subject to the
presumption against retroactivity and did not apply to conduct that
occurred prior to the 1991 Amendment.
In Landgraf, the Court discussed the constitutional concerns that
support the presumption against retroactive application of statutes." The
Court stressed the constitutional significance of protecting the rights of
"citizens"" and "individuals" 8 6 "to fair notice, reasonable reliance, and
settled expectations." 8 7 The Court stated that, unless Congress indicates
otherwise, no law shall apply retroactively to "statutes burdening rivate
8
rights" ; to statutes "affecting contractual or property rights"; or to
statutes that negatively affect vested rights. 90
Despite the constitutional concerns inherent in the retroactive
application of most statutes, in Landgraf the Court indicated that the
presumption against retroactivity regularly does not apply to statutes that
give or take away jurisdiction because jurisdictional statutes do not give

77.

Id.

78. Id. at 249-50.
79. Id. at 255-56.
80. Id at 281.
81. Id at 282.
82. Id. at 283. But see id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion he argued that the presumption against retroactivity should not have applied
because the defending company did not have a vested right to allow sexual harassment; therefore,
the 1991 Amendment did not affect the company's vested rights. Id. "[Tihere is no such thing as
a vested right to do wrong." Id.
83. Id at 283 (majority opinion).
84. Id at 265-67, 270.
85. Id at 265 n.18.
86. Id. at 265.
87. Id at 270.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 271.
90. Id. at 272.
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or take away substantive rights. 9 1 Unlike a statute that affects substantive
vested rights, jurisdictional statutes "speak to the power of the court
rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties." 92 Regardless of
when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, jurisdictional statutes in
effect at the time an action commences govern the action's jurisdictional
analysis. 9 3
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, ex rel. Schumer, Schumer
sued Hughes pursuant to the False Claims Act's (FCA) qui tam
provision. 9 4 Schumer alleged that Hughes submitted the allegedly false
claims to the government in 1982 and 1984.95 In 1986, an amendment
was made to the FCA that, if the amendment applied to Hughes's preamendment conduct, would preclude Schumer from suing Hughes. 9 6 The
Court concluded that (1) Congress did not manifest an intent that the FCA
amendment apply to pre-amendment conduct 9 7 and (2) the FCA
amendment had a retroactive effect. 9 8 The FCA amendment had a
retroactive effect because it substantively changed the cause of action by
eliminating a defense." The Court further reasoned that the FCA
amendment had a retroactive effect because the amendment was not
merely jurisdictional, but rather it created jurisdiction where none existed
before.' 0 0 Therefore, the Court held that the presumption against
retroactivity precluded the FCA amendment from applying to the preamendment conduct.' 0 1
Accordingly, the presumption against retroactivity applies to statutes
that have a retroactive effect, such as adding or removing a substantive
private right. However, the presumption does not apply if Congress
intends that the law apply retroactively or if the law merely gives or takes
away jurisdiction. Whether the presumption against retroactivity applied
to the FSIA was ultimately decided in Republic ofAustria v. Altmann.102

91.

Id. at 274.

92.
93.
94.

Id
See id.
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 943 (1997).

95.

Id at 945.

96.
97.
98.

Id at 951-52.
Id at 946.
Id at 947.

99. Id at 948. In Hughes, the Court explained that "[a] law that abolishes an affirmative
defense violates the Ex Post FactoClause" and has an impermissible retroactive effect; therefore,
the presumption against retroactivity must apply. Id (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.

37, 49 (1990)).
100. Id. at 951.
101.

Id. at 951-52.

102.

See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 694-96 (2004).
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C. Republic of Austria v. Altmann
In Republic ofAustria v. Altmann, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed
the precedent described in Parts II.A and II.B, and held that the FSIA
applied retroactively to the Nazis' expropriations of Jewish-owned art.10 3
The claimant, Marie Altmann, was born in Austria in 1916 and remained
there until shortly after the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1938.'' Before
the rise of Nazi Germany, Altmann's uncle, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, who
also resided in Austria, commissioned multiple paintings from a
renowned Austrian artist, Gustav Klimt.'os These paintings included the
Portraitof Adele Bloch-Bauer, an iconic painting that Austrians now
regard as their Mona Lisa.10 6 Adele died in 1925, leaving a will that asked
Ferdinand to give the paintings to the Austrian Gallery after his death.o7
Ferdinand fled Austria before it was annexed, and subsequently, a Nazi
agent seized and later sold Ferdinand's paintings, some of which were
acquired by the Austrian Gallery. 0 8 In 1945, Ferdinand died, leaving his
estate to Altmann as well as other beneficiaries."' At the time that
Altmann filed her art restitution action in a U.S. court, she was
Ferdinand's sole surviving beneficiary."10
After the war, Altmann (a U.S. citizen as of 1945) and her family
attempted to recover the Klimt paintings from the Austrian Gallery, but
to no avail.i' The Gallery insisted that Adele and Ferdinand donated the
Klimt paintings to the Gallery.1 2 However, in 1998, a journalist
discovered that the Gallery knew that the paintings were actually seized
by a Nazi agent and that the provision in Adele's will was merely a nonbinding request.11 3 In response to the journalist's findings and the
resulting public outcry, Austria passed a law allowing victims of Nazi
expropriation to reclaim property that had been wrongfully taken by the
Nazis. 1 14 That provision gave a committee of Austrian officials the
authority to determine whether Austria would return the art to its rightful
owner.11 5 Altmann tried to take advantage of the new law, but the
103.

See id. at 697; supra Parts IIA-B.

104.
105.

Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681.
Id. at 680-81.

106.

O'CONNOR, supra note 1, at xiii.

107.
108.
109.

Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681-82.
Id. at 682.
Id at 681.

110.

Id.

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id at 681, 683.
Id at 683.
Id at 684.
Id.

115.

See id.
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committee refused to return the paintings to her. The committee insisted
that the Gallery was the rightful owner of the paintings under the terms
of Adele's will.116
Subsequently, Altmann sued the Republic of Austria and the Austrian
Gallery, an instrumentality of Austria (hereinafter referred to collectively
as the "Gallery").1 7 Altmann's complaint alleged that she was the
rightful owner of the Klimt paintings and that the FSIA gave the court
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Gallery."i 8 Altmann argued that the
FSIA's expropriation exemption precluded the Gallery from claiming
foreign sovereign immunity. 119 In response, the Gallery argued that it had
absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts because the FSIA
did not exist at the time of the alleged Nazi expropriation of the Klimt
paintings and the FSIA did not retroactively deprive the Gallery of
immunity.1 20
The U.S. district court rejected the Gallery's arguments and held that
the FSIA applied to pre-FSIA conduct and that the expropriation
exception applied to Altmann's claims; therefore, the Gallery could not
invoke foreign sovereign immunity.12' The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.1 2 2 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted the Gallery's petition for writ of certiorari. 12 3 The Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit's decision.1 2 4
The Court addressed only whether the FSIA applied to conduct that
occurred prior to the FSIA's enactment, 12 5 but did not address the merits
or justiciability of Altmann's claims or the Gallery's defenses.' 2 6 The
Court applied the default rule in Landgrafregarding the presumption
against retroactivity and found that it was not dispositive.' The Court
first considered whether Congress expressly stated or manifested an
intent that the FSIA apply to pre-FSIA conduct.1 2 8 The Court noted that
the FSIA's preamble suggested, but did not expressly state, that the FSIA
applied to pre-FSIA conduct.1 2 9 Later in the Court's opinion, the Court
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 681-84.
Id at 685.
Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 681, 686.
Id at 686-87.
Id. at 687 n.8.
Id. at 688.

124.

Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 681.
See id at 692, 700-02.
Id. at 692.
Id at 694.

129.

Id
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indicated that it found "clear evidence" in the preamble that the
legislature intended the FSIA to apply to pre-enactment conduct.1 3 0

However, since the FSIA did not contain an express command
regarding whether the FSIA applied to pre-enactment conduct, the Court
considered whether the FSIA had a retroactive effect.131 The Court
concluded that the FSIA did not affect any substantive rights because a
claim of sovereign immunity under the FSIA is merely a jurisdictional
defense.1 3 2 Furthermore, the FSIA did not increase liability for past
conduct or impose new duties on the parties.1 33 The Court also explained
that the presumption against retroactivity was to avoid post hoc changes
to rules that the parties relied on. 134 The purpose of the FSIA was never
to allow foreign sovereigns to rely on a promise of future immunity and
to shape their conduct accordingly. 135 Since the FSIA had no retroactive
effect, the default rule in Landgrafregarding the presumption against
retroactivity did not preclude the FSIA from applying to pre-FSIA
conduct.1 36
Since the presumption against retroactivity did not apply to the FSIA,
the Court considered whether there were any other factors that would bar
the FSIA's application to pre-enactment conduct.1 37 The Court
acknowledged its long-standing custom of deferring to the decisions of
the political branches regarding foreign sovereign immunity
determinations and noted that the FSIA was the most recent decision of a
political branch regarding foreign sovereign immunity.1 38 The Court
explained that neither the FSIA nor the circumstances surrounding the
FSIA's enactment suggested that the FSIA should not apply to preenactment conductl 39 and that a retroactive application of the FSIA was
consistent with the purpose of the FSIA. 14( Accordingly, the Court
concluded that it should continue to defer to the now-in-effect decision
of a political branch regarding foreign sovereign immunity, i.e., the FSIA,
regardless of when the cause of action's underlying conduct occurred.141
Notably, the Court declined to review, and thus left undisturbed, the
appellate court's conclusion that the expropriation exception applied to
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id at 697.
Id. at 694; see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id at 694-96.
Id at 697.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 697.
Id at 699.
Id. at 696, 700.
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Altmann's claims against the Gallery.1 4 2 Accordingly, U.S. courts had
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Gallery because the Gallery's preFSIA conduct fit within the FSIA's expropriation exception, depriving
the Gallery of foreign sovereign immunity. Altmann's claims passed
jurisdictional muster.
Despite Altmann's success at the U.S. Supreme Court, the prospect of
lengthy and costly litigation on the merits of Altmann's claim was
daunting, particularly because, at the time, Altmann was approaching her
90th birthday. 14 3 Therefore, Altmann and the Gallery agreed to submit to
binding arbitration in Austria. 1 " After months of deliberation, the three
arbiters unanimously agreed that Altmann was entitled to recover the
Klimt paintings. 1 4 5 Although Altmann's art restitution claims were
ultimately resolved outside the U.S. judicial system, the Court's decision
in Altmann profoundly affected art restitution law. The Court addressed
only the narrow issue of whether the FSIA applied to conduct that
occurred prior to its enactment; however, the Altmann decision opened
the doors of U.S. courts to claims brought by long-suffering victims of
Nazi expropriation against foreign sovereigns who refuse to relinquish
possession of the expropriated art.
D. Altmann's Progeny and the Expanding Scope of the FSIA's
ExpropriationException
Since Altmann, U.S. courts have further developed and extended the
scope of the FSIA's jurisdictional grant. Altmann made claims against
foreign sovereigns for the recovery of Nazi-expropriated art possible in
U.S. courts by broadening the temporal scope of permissible claims to
those that arose out of pre-FSIA conduct. 14 6 Without Altmann, the courts
in Cassirerv. Kingdom of Spain and Simon v. Republic ofHungary, and
many others, could not have reached the conclusions that they did.1 47 Like
in Altmann, the claims in Cassirer and Simon arose out of the Nazi's
wrongful expropriation of property. 14 8 In Cassirer,the court broadened
the potential defendants that could be hailed into U.S. courts under the
FSIA's expropriation exception to include foreign sovereigns that were
not involved in the original expropriation, had no knowledge of the
142.

Id. at 686-87, 687 n.8.

143.

See E. Randol Schoenberg, The Recovery from Austria of Five Paintings by Gustav

Klimt, 9 IFAR J. 28, 40 (2006).
144. Id
145. Id.
146. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 685-88.
147. Id.; Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc);
Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
148. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 680-81; Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1022; Simon, 812 F.3d at 132.
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expropriation or the art's provenance, and had acquired the property in
good faith.1 4 9 Significantly, Spain (the party that possessed the art at the
time of the action) was not immune even though it had not itselftaken the
painting in violation of international law.1 5 0 In Simon, the court further
broadened the scope of the FSIA's expropriation exception by concluding
that genocidal takings violated international law under the FSIA's
expropriation exception.151 Although the FSIA, the Court's opinion in
Altmann, and Altmann's progeny enabled art-restitution claimants to
obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, 152 other
procedural obstacles continued to block many claimants from recovering
their Nazi-expropriated art, namely the statutes of limitations under state
law.1

53

E. The Remaining Obstacle to Reaching the Merits: States'
Statutes ofLimitations
Generally, statutes of limitations are areas of state law concern. 1 5 4
"The purpose of a statute of limitations is to 'stimulate to activity and
punish negligence' and 'promote repose by giving security and stability
55
In most states, the statute of limitations for the
to human affairs."s
recovery of personal property ranges from two to six years. 5 6 However,
some states have altered the statute of limitations for certain types of
personal property, such as art, since it may be easy to conceal.1 5 7 Rather
than extend the duration of a statute of limitations, states have changed
when the statutory time period begins to run (i.e., when the cause of
action accrues). 58 States that have altered the rules for their statute of
limitations in this manner generally adhere to one of three ways of
determining when the cause of action accrued and whether the statute of
149.

Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1031-32.

150. Id. at 1037. In fact, Cassirerpushed the scope of the FSIA's expropriation exception
further than Altmann even contemplated. During the Altmann oral argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Gallery's counsel stated definitively that the mere possession of expropriated
property did not fit within the FSIA's expropriation exception. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-

7, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
151. Simon, 812F.3dat 142-46.
152.

See supra Parts II.A-D.

153. See, e.g., Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2007).
154. See generally Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429-30
(N.Y. 1991).
155. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. 1980) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101
U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
156. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 287 (7th Cir. 1990); O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 865; Lerner, supra note 48, at 16.
157. See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at868-69, 871.
158.

See id. at 869; Lerner, supra note 48, at 18-20.
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limitations bars the claim.
First, the "Discovery and Due Diligence Rule" has been applied in
New Jersey, Indiana, and California (relating to property stolen prior to
1983), among other states.' 5 9 Under this rule, the statute of limitations
time period will not begin to run until the injured party discovers, or with
due diligence should have discovered, facts which would form the basis
of a cause of action to recover the personal property, including the
identity of the possessor.1 6 0 A claimant may have reasonably been able to
discover the facts necessary to state a claim if, among other things, the
artwork had been sold at a public auction, especially if the auction was
highly publicized, if the name of the purchaser of the artwork was stated
in a publicly-available catalogue raisonne,161 or if the artwork was
registered as stolen through an organization that provides a publiclyavailable registry of stolen artworks.1 6 2 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has held that a claimant (whose Byzantine
mosaics were looted) exercised sufficient due diligence by contacting
various international organizations, journalists, collectors, museums,
experts, and scholars who would likely help the claimant recover the
mosaics. 1 6 3 Furthermore, whether the claimant exercised due diligence
depends on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 164 A possessor of
artwork who has fraudulently prevented a potential claimant from
discovering the facts necessary to establish "a cause of action cannot take
advantage of his wrongdoing by raising the statute of limitations"
defense.1 65 Ultimately, whether a claimant has exercised sufficient due
diligence for the purposes of the Discovery and Due Diligence Rule is a
fact-intensive inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 1 6 6
A second type of statute of limitations rule, the "Actual Discovery
Rule," has been applied in California since 1983 to actions brought
against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer for an unlawful taking of
fine art.1 6 7 Under the Actual Discovery Rule, the statute of limitations
159.

F.3d 734,
160.
161.
162.

See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 288; Orkin v. Taylor, 487

741-42 (9th Cir. 2007); O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870.
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869.
Orkin, 487 F.3d at 741-42.
See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 866, 870.

163.

Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 281, 290.

164.

Id. at 288.

165. Id. However, if the claimant was not "reasonably diligent in discovering the fraud," the
statute of limitations will begin to run at the time that the claimant reasonably should have

discovered the fraud. Id. (citing to Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (1956)).
166. Id. at 289.
167. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3) (West 2016) (defining fine art as "any work ofvisual
art, including but not limited to, a drawing, painting, sculpture, mosaic, or photograph, a work of
calligraphy, work of graphic art ...
crafts . .. or mixed media"); CAL. CIV. CODE § 982(d)(1)
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time period will not begin to run until the claimant discovers the identity
of the possessor of the stolen property, without regard to claimant's
exercise of due diligence (or lack thereof) in searching for the stolen
property.1 68 Additionally, "actual discovery" includes the discovery of
the whereabouts of the unlawfully-taken artwork and the discovery that
the claimant has a possessory interest in the artwork.1 69 Actual discovery
"does not include constructive knowledge imputed by law."1 70 The
Actual Discovery Rule lessens the burden on the claimant by eliminating
the due diligence requirement; however, the claimant must still establish
when certain information was discovered in order to determine when the
statute of limitations began to run, which may be a fact-intensive inquiry
and difficult to prove.
A third type of statute of limitations rule is the "Demand and Refusal
Rule." A New York court first applied the Demand and Refusal Rule in
Menzel v. List where the claimant was suing a New York art collector to
recover a painting that was stolen during World War II.171 The Demand
and Refusal Rule states that the statute of limitations time period begins
to run when the defendant refuses to convey the personal property upon
the claimant's demand, and not when the actual theft or taking
occurred.1 72 The statute of limitations will only begin to run when the
party in possession of the art has absolutely and unconditionally refused
to return the art to its rightful owner. 173 This rule was applied in De Csepel
v. Hungary, where the state's statute of limitations did not bar the artrestitution claim because the claimant had filed his complaint after
Hungary refused to return the art but before the statute of limitations time
period had expired.1 74 The Demand and Refusal Rule grants the most
protection to the rightful owners of stolen property because it clearly
indicates when the statute of limitations begins to run without a factintensive inquiry regarding when the claimant discovered certain
information, it provides more time for the claimant to receive notice of
the artwork's whereabouts, and it relieves the injured party from having
to prove that its search for the artwork was reasonably diligent.' 7 5
The different accrual rules that states apply to their statutes of
(West 2016); Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2007).
168. See Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788, 792 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).

§ 338(c)(3)(A).

169.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

170.

Id.

171.

Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1966); Lerner, supra note 48, at

172.
173.
174.
175.

Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
De Csepel v. Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 603 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 604.
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991).

§ 338(c)(3)(C)(i).

20.
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limitations often result in widely different outcomes for claimants
seeking to recover their Nazi-expropriated art. 1 76 For example, in some
states, such as a state that applies the claimant-friendly Demand and
Refusal Rule, the statute of limitations may not prevent a court from
reaching the merits of the claim.1 7 7 However, under the same facts but
applying a different state's accrual rule, such as a state that applies one
of the discovery-related rules, the claimants entire claim may be timebarred, resultin in no relief for the long-suffering victims of Nazi
expropriation.17 8 Despite the adoption of accrual rules, the statute of
limitations in most states has effectively barred claimants from
recovering their Nazi-expropriated art. 1 79 One state sought to remedy the
effect of its statute of limitations by enacting a law that extended the
statute of limitations for matters relating to the restitution of Naziexpropriated art.180 However, the law was declared unconstitutional
because it impinged on the federal government's exclusive authority over
foreign affairs and war-related claims.' 8 ' Therefore, to give teeth to its
numerous declarations of support to victims of Nazi expropriation and
for art restitution efforts, Congress passed the HEAR Act as "the latest
step" in its effort "to help restore artwork and other cultural property to
its rightful owners." 1 82 Since states cannot make exceptions to their own
statutes of limitations to accommodate the unique circumstances
surrounding the recovery of Nazi-expropriated art, Congress alone had
the authority to correct this injustice.

176.

See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. 1980) (indicating that if the Demand

and Refusal Rule applied, then the statute of limitations would not have expired and the claimant
could have recovered her stolen artwork; however, since the court concluded that the Discovery

and Due Diligence Rule applied, more fact-finding regarding the claimant's diligence was needed
in order to determine whether the statute of limitations had expired).

177.

See id.

178.

See id.

179.

S. REP. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016).

180.

Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir.

2009).
181.
182.

Id. at 965-68.
S. REP. No. 114-394, at 2-5.
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III - THE HOLOCAUST EXPROPRIATED ART RECOVERY
ACT OF 2016

A. Introduction to the HEAR Act
1. The HEAR Act's Journey Through the U.S. Legislature
The HEAR Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate on April 7, 2016.183
It was originally sponsored by Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), Senator Ted
Cruz (R-TX), Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Senator Richard
Blumenthal (D-CT).1 84 Since its introduction, numerous co-sponsors
added their support for the HEAR Act and it enjoyed considerable bipartisan support. 8 5
On June 7, 2016, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution,
Civil Rights and Human Rights along with the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal
Courts held a joint hearing on the HEAR Act. 186 The hearing was a
somber event that involved lengthy statements from Senators and
testimony from witnesses regarding the significance of and dire need for
the passage of the HEAR Act.1 87 The witnesses and Senators
acknowledged the renewed public interest in the plight of Naziexpropriation victims that followed the release of Women in Gold, a film
that illustrated Marie Altmann's struggle to recover her family's Klimt
paintings from the Gallery.' 8 8 During the hearing, the Senators stated that
their goal was to provide justice for victims of Nazi expropriation and to
stop arbitrary time-based bars from preventing art restitution claims from
reaching the merits of the claim.1 89 The Senators indicated that the HEAR
Act could achieve this goal because it sets a federal statute of limitations
(preempting statutes of limitations under state law) that is only triggered
when the claimant has actual knowledge of the identity and location of
the expropriated property and knowledge of their possessory interest in
the property.1 90 The witnesses, who have expert knowledge or personal
183.

All Bill Information for Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/l 4th-congress/senate-bill/2763/all-info?result
Index=1#major-actions (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See generally id.
188. Holocaust ExpropriatedArtRecovery Act - Reuniting Victims with their Lost Heritage:
Hearing on S. 2763 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & the Subcomm. on Oversight,
Agency Action, Fed. Rights, and Fed. Courts, 114th Cong. (2016).
189. See id.
190. See id.
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experience on the topic of art restitution, testified regarding the many
challenges facing claimants who seek to recover their Nazi-expropriated
art, including the legal challenges that statutes of limitations under state
law have caused, along with other logistical and evidentiary
challenges.

19

1

A few months following the hearing, the Judiciary Committee
reported an amendment to the HEAR Act in the nature of a substitute.' 9 2
A related bill was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on
October 11, 2016 and referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution
and Civil Justice.1 9 3 In early December 2016, the HEAR Act passed in
the U.S. House of Representatives and in the U.S. Senate. On December
16, 2016, the HEAR Act was signed by former President Barack Obama
and became a law. 194
2. The Purpose and Findings of the HEAR Act
The HEAR Act states that the purpose of the law is to harmonize
federal law with the policies set forth in the Washington Conference
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act,
and the Terezin Declaration.1 9 5 The HEAR Act's second purpose is to
ensure that art restitution claims regarding Nazi-expropriated art "are not
unfairly barred by statutes of limitations but are resolved in a just and fair
manner." 19 6
The HEAR Act makes numerous findings that support its passage.
First, the HEAR Act acknowledges that the Nazis misappropriated
thousands of pieces of art and other property "throughout Europe as part
of their genocidal campaign against the Jewish people."' 97 The HEAR
Act also restates the oft-quoted statement that the Nazis' conduct
constituted the "greatest displacement of art in human history." 9 8 Next,
191.

See id.; Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,

§

2(6), 130 Stat. 1524.
192. All Bill Information for Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ I 4th-congress/senate-biI/2763/all-info?result
CONGRESS.GOV,

Index=1#major-actions (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
193. Id.
194. All Bill Information for Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016,
(last
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ll 4th-congress/house-bill/6130/actions
CONGRESS.GOV,

visited Feb. 12, 2017).

§
§

195.
196.

Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016

3(1); see supra Part I.
3(2).

197.

Id.

198.

Id; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 957 (9th

§ 2(1).

Cir. 2010) (quoting MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN

AMERICA'S COURTS 202 (N.Y.U. Press 2003)). "During World War I, the Nazis stole hundreds
of thousands of artworks from museums and private collections throughout Europe, in what has
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the HEAR Act makes several findings regarding the United States and
the international community's efforts to return the expropriated art to
their home countries and rightful owners, such efforts include the
Washington Conference, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the
Holocaust Era Assets Conference (which issued the Terezin
Declaration).'
Congress's findings also state that victims of Nazi
expropriation, and more recently the victims' heirs, have tried to recover
Nazi-expropriated art through the U.S. courts; however, these claimants
have faced "significant procedural obstacles partly due to State statutes
of limitations." 200 The HEAR Act describes how states' statutes of
limitations typically employ the Discovery and Due Diligence Rule
which imposes time constraints that are "especially burdensome" to
claimants in light of the "unique and horrific circumstances of World War
II and the Holocaust." 2 0 1 Congress explains that, since the states lacked
the authority to make an exception for Nazi-expropriation victims in their
statutes of limitations, federal legislation was needed to correct the unfair
burden the statutes of limitations placed on these victims. 2 0 2
3. The HEAR Act's Substantive Provisions
The HEAR Act created a blanket statute of limitations applicable to
claims for the recovery of Nazi-expropriated art, regardless of any other
provisions in state or federal law to the contrary. 2 0 3 Under the HEAR Act,
the statute of limitations is six years and it accrues, or begins to run, when
the claimant has "actual[ly] discover[ed]" each of the following: (1) the
identity of the artwork; (2) the location of the artwork; and (3) that the
claimant has a "possessory interest" in the artwork (the foregoing three
elements are hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Requisite
Information").2 04 Six years after the actual discovery of the Requisite
Information, the claimant will be time-barred from filing a claim to
recover the Nazi-expropriated art in U.S. courts. 2 0 5 Under the HEAR Act,
"actual discovery" means that the claimant has actual knowledge of the
Requisite Information. 2 06
been termed the 'greatest displacement of art in human history."' MICHAEL J. BAZYLER,
HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS 202 (N.Y.U. Press

2003).
199.
200.

Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016
Id. § 2(6).

201.
202.

See id.; supra Part II.E.
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. § 5(a).
Id.
Id.
See id. § 4(1), (4).

§ 2(2)-(5).
§ 2(7).
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The HEAR Act provides special rules for pre-existing claims. 2 0 7 It
states that a pre-existing claim is deemed "actually discovered" on the
date of the HEAR Act's enactment if: (1) before enactment, the claimant
had actual knowledge of the Requisite Information and the claim was
barred by a federal or state statute of limitations; or (2) before enactment,
the claimant had actual knowledge of the Requisite Information and the
claim was not barred by a federal or state statute of limitations. 2 0 8
Therefore, with certain exceptions, if the claimant had the Requisite
Information on or before the date of the HEAR Act's enactment, the
statute of limitations begins to run on the date of enactment.2 0 9
The HEAR Act applies to claims that are pending on the date of its
enactment, including claims pending on appeal, and to claims filed after
the date of enactment, so long as the claims are filed before or pending
when the HEAR Act sunsets on December 31, 2026.210 For claims that
are filed on or after January 1, 2027, claimants will be bound by
applicable state and federal statutes of limitations.2 11
B. Analysis of the HEAR Act
1. "Actual Discovery" and the Sufficiency of the Actual Discovery Rule
Since the HEAR Act's definition of "actual discovery" requires
"actual knowledge" of the Requisite Information, the HEAR Act likely
prevents a defendant from arguing that a claim is time-barred merely
because the claimant had constructive knowledge of the Requisite
Information more than six years before the claim was filed.2 12 Senate
Report 394 supports the proposition that constructive knowledge is
insufficient because it states that the intent of the "actual discovery"
requirement is "to require more than access to the information ... . [t]he
party must have the knowledge itself or have sufficient information to
constitute actual knowledge." 2 13 Additionally, the definitions of "actual
discovery" and "knowledge" are silent about the claimant's diligence,
which suggests that there is no requirement that the claimant exercise due
diligence in acquiring the Requisite Information. 2 14 Therefore, a
§ 5(c).

207.
208.

Id.
Id

209.

Id. There are exceptions to the pre-existing claim rules. See id.

210.
211.
212.

Id. § 5(g).
Id
See id. § 4(1), (4); e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
See S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 8-9 (2016).

213.
214.

§

5(e).

§ 338(c)(3)(C)(i) (West 2016).

See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016

§

4(1), (4); Naftzger v. Am.

Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that due diligence
was not required under the discovery rule of accrual). But see Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 741
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claimant, even one who has constructive knowledge of the Requisite
Information for more than six years or who has not diligently tried to
discover the Requisite Information, may file a claim in U.S. courts, so
long as "actual discovery" of the Reuisite Information occurred within
the six years prior to filing the claim. 15
The HEAR Act's "actual discovery" requirement mirrors the Actual
Discovery Rule applied in California since 1983, which, because it
eliminates the diligence requirement, is far more generous to claimants
than the Discovery and Due Diligence Rule.2 1 6 Under the Discovery and
Due Diligence Rule, a claim must be dismissed if the fact-finder
determines that the claimant did not exercise a sufficient level of
diligence in acquiring the Requisite Information. 2 17 Since art restitution
claimants face numerous procedural and evidentiary challenges in
bringing their claims in U.S. courts, 2 18 Congress properly chose to utilize
the Actual Discovery Rule in the HEAR Act rather than the Discovery
and Due Diligence Rule. Between these two rules, the Actual Discovery
Rule is less burdensome on the claimant because it does not have a
diligence requirement. However, Congress would have better fulfilled its
objective of freeing Nazi-expropriation victims from time-based limits on
their claims by adopting the Demand and Refusal Rule.
2. Congress Should Have Adopted the Most Claimant-Friendly Accrual
Rule: The Demand and Refusal Rule
Considering the egregious conduct that led to the widespread
expropriation of artworks by the Nazis, the difficulties and defeat that
claimants have experienced in U.S. courts, and the express purpose of the
HEAR Act to remove unfair procedural obstacles so that art restitution
claims could be decided on their merits, Congress should have
incorporated in the HEAR Act a statute of limitations accrual rule that
was as broad and claimant-friendly as possible. Congress will fulfill its
objectives more fully if it amends the HEAR Act to incorporate the
Demand and Refusal Rule. This rule is more claimant-friendly than the
discovery-related rules because it does not require a claimant to prove
when the Requisite Information was actually discovered or that the
claimant was reasonably diligent in discovering the Requisite
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that due diligence is required under the discovery rule of accrual).
215. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 4, 5; S. REP. No. 114-394, at
8-9.
216. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 4, 5; Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991); supra Part II.E.
217.

See supra Part [I.E.

218.

See Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 430-31; S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 5.
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Information. 2 19 Instead of an "actual discovery" standard, the HEAR Act
should require the following in order for the statute of limitations to
accrue: (1) a written demand for the artwork sent by the claimant to the
current possessor of the artwork, and (2) a refusal by the current
possessor, either express or implied, to return the artwork. The HEAR
Act should indicate that a refusal is implied if the current possessor
received the claimant's written demand, but fails to respond to the
demand within a certain period of time. A provision regarding implied
refusal prevents a current possessor from refusing to respond to the
demand indefinitely, which would delay the claimant's ability to recover
the artwork or to resolve the claim. The Demand and Refusal Rule would
effectively give claimants more time to locate the artwork and to ensure
that they acquired accurate Requisite Information, give more time for the
current possessor to be on notice of the claimant's ownership claim,22 0
and give more time for the parties to communicate regarding the artwork.
Furthermore, these benefits of the Demand and Refusal Rule may better
enable the claimant and the current possessor to reach a private resolution
outside of U.S. courts entirely.
The application of the Demand and Refusal Rule would serve a
claimant-friendly evidentiary function. The rule relieves the claimant
from having to prove when the Requisite Information was actually
discovered. If the HEAR Act is amended to adopt the Demand and
Refusal Rule, the claimant's written demand will be straightforward and
effective evidence that, on the date of the written demand, the claimant
had the Requisite Information and that, shortly thereafter, the current
219.

See Lubell, 596 N.E.2d at 430-31.

While the demand and refusal rule is not the only possible method of measuring
the accrual of replevin claims, it does appear to be the rule that affords the most
protection to the true owners of stolen property. Less protective measures would
include running the . .. statutory period from the time of the theft even where a goodfaith purchaser is in possession of the stolen chattel, or, alternatively, calculating the
statutory period from the time that the good-faith purchaser obtains possession of the
chattel. Other States that have considered this issue have applied a discovery rule to
these cases, with the Statute of Limitations running from the time that the owner
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the whereabouts of the work of art
that had been stolen."

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 430 (explaining that the Governor of New York vetoed legislation that adopted
the discovery rule because the bill did "not provide a reasonable opportunity for individuals or
foreign governments to receive notice of a museum's acquisition and take action to recover it
before their rights were extinguished" and because the legislation would make New York "a haven
for cultural property stolen abroad such objects would be immune from recovery under the limited

periods established by the bill").
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possessor had knowledge of the claimant's claim. A claimant's written
demand singularly proves that the Requisite Information has been
discovered, without the added burden of having to prove when the
Requisite Information was discovered. The Demand and Refusal Rule
removes the laborious fact-finding process that may be involved in
determining when the Requisite Information was discovered and replaces
it with a determination of a simple fact: when the written demand was
sent to the current possessor of the art. This rule is simple to apply;
therefore, if it were incorporated into the HEAR Act, it would effectively
limit any dispute regarding whether a claim is time-barred by the HEAR
Act. The limited complexity of the Demand and Refusal Rule properly
allows the claimant to focus his or her effort, time, and resources on
litigating the merits of the claim rather than litigating the accrual of the
statute of limitations.
Lastly, the HEAR Act may limit the rights of claimants who live in a
state that has adopted a more claimant-friendly accrual rule (e.g., the
Demand and Refusal Rule) than the HEAR Act's Actual Discovery Rule.
The HEAR Act applies to claims that are not yet barred by state or federal
statutes of limitations. 2 2 1 According to Section 5(c) of the HEAR Act, a
claim is deemed actually discovered on the date of enactment if, on or
before its enactment, the claimant had actual knowledge of the Requisite
Information. 2 2 2 Therefore, for pre-existing claims (i.e., where claimants
have already discovered the Requisite Information, but have not yet filed
their claim in a U.S. court), the statute of limitations accrues on the date
of the HEAR Act's enactment. 2 2 3 Since the HEAR Act preempts other
federal and state statutes of limitations, 2 2 4 this treatment of pre-existing
claims may restrict claimants who live in a state that applies a more
generous accrual rule than the one provided in the HEAR Act, such as a
state that applies the Demand and Refusal Rule. For claimants whose
state statute of limitations follows the Demand and Refusal Rule, the
HEAR Act will force the statute of limitations to accrue prior to when it
would accrue under state law. Congress should amend the HEAR Act to
apply the Demand and Refusal Rule so that claimants who live in a state
that applies the Demand and Refusal Rule are not forced to apply the
HEAR Act's accrual rule. Alternatively, Congress should amend the
HEAR Act to allow a claimant to elect to invoke the state's statute of
limitations and accrual rules if the state's rules are more beneficial to the
claimant.
221.

Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308,

Stat. 1524.

222.
223.
224.

Id.
See id.
See id. § 5(a).

§ 5(c), 130
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Summarily, the HEAR Act will satisfy its purpose more fully if it is
amended to incorporate the Demand and Refusal Rule. This rule provides
the claimant with additional time before the statute of limitations will
begin to run and it simplifies the fact-finding process for determining
when the statute of limitations began to run. Additionally, the HEAR Act
should be amended because it preempts state statutes of limitations, even
state statutes of limitations that are more beneficial to the claimant. A
claimant is bound by the HEAR Act's statute of limitations even if the
claimant's state has adopted a more claimant-friendly accrual rule, such
as the Demand and Refusal Rule.

CONCLUSION

Since World War II, victims of Nazi expropriation have repeatedly
been denied justice at the hands of technical procedural rules relating to
subject-matterjurisdiction and statutes of limitations under state law. The
FSIA, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, and now the HEAR Act, have each sought to remedy this
injustice. Although the HEAR Act should be amended to adopt the
Demand and Refusal Rule, in its current form it will likely enable many
claims for the recovery of Nazi-expropriated art to reach the merits,
which is laudable even if it is strikingly overdue. As Dame Helen Mirren
said during her testimony at the Senate subcommittee hearing on the
HEAR Act, "[g]reed, cruelty, self-interest, domination, will always be
with us. It's an easy option. Justice is so much more difficult, so much
more complex. But we all dream of justice." Congress's passage of the
HEAR Act allows this long-held dream of justice to finally begin to
become a reality for many long-suffering victims of Nazi expropriation.
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